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I. INTRODUCTION
The first Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defend-
ants ("Guidelines")1 became effective on November 1, 1991.' The
Guidelines represent the federal government's latest action in the de-
veloping area of organizational sanctions and are the result of three
years of work and several prior draft proposals by the United States
Sentencing Commission.
Part II of this Recent Development examines past legal and theo-
retical approaches to the problem of organizational sentencing. Part III
describes both the past and present efforts of the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines for organiza-
tions. Part IV analyzes the new Guidelines in light of the statutory
purposes and prevailing theories of organizational sentencing. Part V
presents proposed amendments to the new Guidelines.
II. BACKGROUND
Organizations are prevalent in American society because they have
the ability to mobilize vast resources in the pursuit of well-defined
goals. 3 Although capable of achieving great social good, organizations
also are capable of great social evils.4 In terms of the numbers of human
1. United States Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg. 22762 (1991). For the official Guidelines as ultimately enacted,
see United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (West, 1991).
Under federal law, an "'organization' means a person other than an individual," 18 U.S.C. § 18
(1988), and "includes corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions,
trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and political subdivisions
thereof, and nonprofit organizations." U.S.S.G. § 8A1.1 n.1 at 349 (1991).
2. Telephone interview with Mike Courlander, the United States Sentencing Commission's
Public Information Specialist (Feb. 1992).
3. For a discussion of the vital and inevitable role of large corporations in the modern indus-
trial economy, see Marshall B. Clinard and Peter C. Yeager, Corporate Crime at 2-4 (Free Press,
1980).
4. See, for example, Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Ap-
proach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 Yale L. J. 353, 353-54 & n.1 (1979); Laureen Snider, The
Regulatory Dance: Understanding Reform Processes in Corporate Crime, 19 Intl. J. Soc. L. 209,
209-10 (1991). See generally Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime. The national and international
economic and political power of the world's largest corporations is staggering. In 1978, the two
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lives and the amounts of property involved, the social harm caused by
organizations greatly exceeds the harm that individuals cause.' In order
to control the great potential of modern organizations to cause social
harm, the federal government increasingly has turned to criminal
sanctions.6
A. Past Legal Approaches to Organizational Sanctions
According to well-established law, organizations can be criminally
liable.7 Most organizations possess all the legal powers of an individual
and likewise are capable of committing virtually any crime that an indi-
vidual can commit All organizations must act through agents, and in
the federal system, organizations are vicariously liable for the crimes of
their agents.' Furthermore, the traditional purposes of criminal sanc-
tions-deterrence, just punishment, and rehabilitation' 0-apply to or-
ganizational defendants just as they apply to individual defendants."
Generally, all agree that certain acts of organizations merit criminal
sanctions. Considerably less agreement exists, however, as to what those
sanctions should be.
largest American corporations in terms of sales, General Motors and Exxon, "each had annual
sales totaling over $60 billion, a sum that far exceed[ed] the total revenues of any state in the
United States and those of most countries in the world." Id. at 1-2.
5. The U.S.A., the country with the highest rate of homicide in the developed world,
reports 20,000 murders in an average year. By contrast, 14,000 deaths per annum are caused
by industrial accidents, many of which stem from violations of safety codes; 30,000 deaths
result from unsafe and usually illegal consumer products; and hundreds of thousands of can-
cer deaths are caused by legal and illegal environmental pollution....
Dollar losses are also horrendous. Corporate crime costs far more than street crime-all
the street crime in the U.S. in a given years [sic] is estimated to cost around $4 billion, much
less than 5% of the average take from corporate crime.
Snider, Intl. J. Soc. L. at 209 (cited in note 4). See also Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime at 7-
12 (cited in note 3).
6. See Note, 89 Yale L. J. at 354 & n.7 (cited in note 4).
7. See id. at 353 & nn.2-6. "The Supreme Court first recognized the criminal liability of
corporations in New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)."
Id. at 353 n.2.
8. See Note, 89 Yale L. J. at 353 & nn.2-6.
9. U.S.S.G. Ch. 8, intro, comment, at 347; Note, 89 Yale L. J. at 353 n.2; Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law at 398 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1986) (stating that "[i]f a crime at
least ostensibly in the corporation's behalf is committed or condoned at the directorial or manage-
rial level of the corporation, the corporation is criminally liable").
10. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations, in United States
Sentencing Commission, Discussion Materials on Organization Sanctions at 35 & n.149 (1988)
("Discussion"); Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a) at 31-
36 (West, 1986).
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3553(a)(7), 3553(c), 3556, 3663-64 (1988); U.S.S.G. Ch. 8, intro.
comment, at 347.
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1. Organizational Sanctions Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984
The criminal law, as originally designed by common-law courts and
early legislatures, focused entirely on the individual. 12 The theory of
punishment that permeated this system of individual sanctions was the
utilitarian model associated with Jeremy Bentham. 1 Because the utili-
tarians viewed human beings as rational, self-interested, utility maxi-
mizers, they thought that criminal sanctions should be designed to
outweigh the gains that committing a crime produced. 4 For serious of-
fenses that the law sought to prohibit absolutely-such as murder-the
only sufficient sanctions were physical restraints on life and lib-
erty-the death penalty and imprisonment.15 As criminal defendants
began to include organizations as well as individuals, courts and legisla-
tures simply extended the existing scheme of individual-based criminal
sanctions to organizational defendants. 6
Although grounded on the same utilitarian principles as individual
sanctions, organizational sanctions necessarily took a more limited
form. Because organizations had no "soul to be damned, and no body to
be kicked,' imprisonment and the death penalty, the cornerstones of
the criminal sanctioning scheme for individuals, were inapplicable. 8
Therefore; for many years the only available organizational sanctions
were monetary,' 9 consisting of fines or restitution. 0
Dissatisfaction with monetary sanctions, 2' however, caused courts,
legislatures, and scholars to consider organizational probation as a sup-
plement or alternative to fines. A federal court first upheld the propri-
ety of probation as an organizational sanction in United States v.
12. See Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends at 1-2 (Harper & Row, 1975).
13. See id. at 9-10.
14. See id.; Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 35 & n.151 (cited in note 10).
15. See Stone, Where the Law Ends at 30-31, 36.
16. See id. at 1-2, 8-10.
17. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick". An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting Edward,
First Baron Thurlow, in Mervyn King, Public Policy and the Corporation at 1 (Wiley, 1977)).
18. See Stone, Where the Law Ends at 36. See also Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment
Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 Am. J.
Crim. L. 1, 4 (1988) (discussing effectiveness of probation over incarceration and fines). Although
revocation of the organization's charter, as in the case of corporations, presented a theoretically
analogous sanction, the consequent harm to society and the ease of acquiring a new charter ren-
dered that option impractical. See Stone, Where the Law Ends at 36.
19. See Stone, Where the Law Ends at 36; Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 4; Note, 89 Yale L.
J. at 354 & n.10 (cited in note 4).
20. Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, restitution was available as
a sanction only when authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64 (1988). See note 31 and accompanying
text.
21. See notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
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Atlantic Richfield Company22 ("ARCO"). In ARCO, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that a corporation could be sentenced to probation under the
Federal Probation Act.2 3 In order to impose probation under the Fed-
eral Probation Act, however, a sentencing court had to suspend the im-
position or execution of any other sentence.24 Thus, a court could not
require a criminal defendant both to pay a fine and also to serve a pro-
bation term. The court-imposed conditions of probation under the Fed-
eral Probation Act included making charitable contributions, 5
performing community service,26 or implementing various changes in in-
ternal operations designed to detect and prevent repetition of the of-
fense of conviction.
2. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and Beyond
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("the Act")," a title within the
broader Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,9 significantly
changed the use of restitution, fines, and probation as organizational
sanctions. Moreover, the Act replaced the rehabilitation model of crimi-
nal sentencing with the following four sentencing goals. The sentence
should: (1) "reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
22. 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972). ARCO had been convicted repeatedly of illegally dis-
charging oil from a dock facility into a canal. ARCO's recidivism indicated to the trial judge that
the maximum statutory fine for this offense, a mere $2500, would not deter further violations. The
trial judge therefore suspended the fine and imposed probation. The conditions of probation re-
quired that ARCO design and implement a plan for preventing future oil spills. If ARCO failed to
comply, the court threatened to appoint a Special Probation Officer to ensure ARCO's compliance.
For further analysis of the ARCO case, see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 14-15 & n.53 (cited in
note 18); Stone, Where the Law Ends at 184-89 (cited in note 12).
23. 465 F.2d 58. The court found that the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 3651-56 (1970),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, amended by Pub. L. No. 99-217, 99 Stat. 1728
(1985), implied but did not provide expressly for corporate probation. ARCO, 465 F.2d at 61.
24. See Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 15 n.63.
25. See id. at 18-24. Ultimately, all four circuits to consider the issue concluded that the
Federal Probation Act did not authorize probation conditions requiring charitable contributions.
Id. at 18 n.82, 23-24 & nn.111-13. See United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959,
961-64 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Missouri Valley Const. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1544-51 (8th
Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 649-54 (4th Cir.
1984); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1242-44 (10th Cir. 1982).
26. Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 24-25. See, for example, United States v. Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc., 762 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring corporation to loan a corporate officer to a
service organization for 100 hours); United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th
Cir. 1982) (requiring corporation to loan an executive to a charitable organization for one year to
help develop a program for ex-offenders); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159,
1166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring bakery to donate bread to needy organizations).
27. See Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 25-26, 19 nn.84-87 (cited in note 18). See, for example,
ARCO, 465 F.2d at 61; United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1974)
(requiring corporation to refrain from specific business activities).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (Supp. 1985).
29. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
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the law, and provide just punishment for the offense; (2) afford ade-
quate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) protect the public from fur-
ther crimes of the defendant; and (4) provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
tional treatment in the most effective manner."
The Act significantly increased the availability of monetary sanc-
tions. Under the Act, a sentencing court almost always can order an
organizational defendant to pay restitution.$1 The Act also significantly
increased the maximum fines that courts could impose for organiza-
tional crimes in general. 32 In addition, Congress recently has enacted
several statutes raising the maximum fines for the particular crimes of
money laundering,33 major fraud,3" and insider trading.3 5
The Act's provisions on probation3 6 supplanted the Federal Proba-
tion Act and made a number of significant changes. First, under the
Act, probation is a separate sentence that may be imposed in addition
to, rather than merely in suspension of, another sentence.38 Thus, under
the Act, a court may combine a probation sentence with any combina-
tion of fines, criminal forfeitures, notice to victims, or restitution.3 9 Sec-
ond, the Act specifies two mandatory conditions of probation: (1) that
the defendant not commit another federal, state, or local crime during
the term of probation 0 and (2) that, when the offense of conviction is a
felony, the defendant pay a fine, make restitution, or perform commu-
nity service."
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (1988).
31. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3563(b)(3) (1988); Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 37-38, 42 (cited in
note 18).
32. The Act sets the maximum imposable fines for organizations equal to the greater of the
following: (1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense; (2) the greater of twice the
gross gain or loss caused by the offense, if any person derived a pecuniary gain or any person other
than the defendant suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of the offense; (3) $500,000, if the offense
was a felony or a misdemeanor resulting in death; (4) $200,000, if the offense was a class A misde-
meanor not resulting in death; (5) $10,000, if the offense was a class B or C misdemeanor that did
not result in death or an infraction. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(1)-(7), (d) (1988).
33. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Subtitle H, 100 Stat. 3207-
18.
34. Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, 102 Stat. 4631.
35. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677.
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-66 (1988).
37. For a discussion of the implications of the Federal Sentencing Act of 1984 for organiza-
tional probation, see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 31-69.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c).
39. Id.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(1). For a discussion of potential problems in applying this condition
to corporations, see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 35-36.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2). For a discussion of potential problems in applying this condition
to corporations, see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 36-41.
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Third, the Act authorizes courts to impose discretionary conditions
of probation provided that: (1) they are reasonably related to the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of
the defendant, and the four goals of sentencing and (2) they deprive
defendants of liberty or property only to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the four goals of sentencing.43 Among those discretion-
ary conditions of probation enumerated in the Act,44 those most
pertinent to organizations include orders of fines, restitution, notice to
victims, community service, restrictions of business activities, and coop-
eration with the supervisory activities of probation officers.45 Thus, as
the most recent and comprehensive statutory treatment of organiza-
tional sanctions, the Act laid the legal foundation for the United States
Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines for organi-
zational defendants.
B. Theories of Organizational Sanctions
Although the Act specified the goals and available means of organi-
zational sanctions, it did not specify how to most appropriately achieve
those goals. Thus, in promulgating sentencing guidelines, the Sentenc-
ing Commission had considerable latitude to choose between competing
theories of what types and combinations of sanctions, generally either
monetary sanctions or probation, were most appropriate in view of the
statutory goals of sentencing. The competing theories can be divided
into two general categories-the neo-classical economics approach and
the organization theory approach.
1. The Neo-Classical Economics Approach 46
The neo-classical economics approach assumes that organizations
are rational utility maximizers, or in the case of business organizations,
profit maximizers. 47 Furthermore, this model tends to view organiza-
tions as unitary actors.48 Based on these assumptions, the economist
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). For a discussion of the application of this standard to discretionary
conditions of probation for corporations, see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 51-55.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). For a discussion of the application of this standard to discretionary
conditions of probation for corporations, see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 55-57.
44. For a discussion of the practical application of these enumerated discretionary conditions
to corporations see Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 41-51.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
46. See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968); Posner, Economic Analysis at 205-12, 397-99 (cited in note 9); Coffee, 79 Mich.
L. Rev. at 389-93 (cited in note 17); Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 33-50 (cited in
note 10).
47. See Posner, Economic Analysis at 205-06.
48. Michael B. Metzger and Charles R. Schwenk, Decision Making Models, Devil's Advo-
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maintains that monetary sanctions alone, if set at the right level, will
deter organizational crime by causing organizations to undertake
whatever internal adjustments are necessary to avoid criminal liabil-
ity.49 According to the economist, such self-regulation is more efficient
than external intervention by courts or probation officers because the
organizations themselves possess the necessary information and re-
sources to make internal adjustments."
Two competing views of the optimal level of monetary sanctions
exist. The "classical deterrence" view is that the total monetary sanc-
tion should be set such that the expected penalty cost outweighs the
expected gain from the offense.51 Conversely, the "optimal penalty"
view is that the total monetary sanction should be set such that the
expected penalty cost equals the expected societal harm from the of-
fense.2 Thus, under both approaches, the expected gain or harm repre-
sents the actual gain or harm resulting from the offense multiplied by
the probability of detection and conviction." Because law enforcement
resources are limited, the probability that any given organizational of-
fender will be detected, prosecuted, and convicted always is less than
one hundred percent.54 Under the classical deterrence model, the total
monetary penalty should equal the expected gain plus a small premium
to ensure that the potential offender is not indifferent to violations of
the law.55 Under the optimal penalty model, however, the total mone-
tary penalty should only equal the expected societal harm. No addi-
tional premium should be added to ensure compliance with the law.
The classical deterrence model is essentially Bentham's utilitarian
model. 5 7 Its basic rationale is that organizations will not commit crimes
if they cannot expect to gain through their crimes.5 Proponents of the
optimal penalty model, however, identify two reasons why classical de-
terrence will inevitably overdeter or underdeter organizational crime.
First, they argue that classical deterrence provides no incentives for or-
ganizations to develop and implement internal monitoring programs to
cacy, and the Control of Corporate Crime, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. 323, 337 & n.97 (1990).
49. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 394 (cited in note 17).
50. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 48-49 (cited in note 10).
51. See Posner, Economic Analysis at 207; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev,. at 389; Parker, Criminal
Sentencing, in Discussion at 36 (cited in note 10).
52. See id. at 33-34.
53. See id. at 34, 36; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 389; Posner, Economic Analysis at 207.
54. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 34, 36; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 389;
Posner, Economic Analysis at 207.
55. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 34, 36; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 389;
Posner, Economic Analysis at 207.
56. Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 34.
57. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
58. Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 34.
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prevent and detect organizational violations. 9 Thus, they argue that
the model will underdeter unless the penalty is increased to account for
these prevention costs.6 0 Because classical deterrence provides no accu-
rate and efficient means of calculating these prevention costs, however,
the tendency will be to overestimate them and thereby overdeter orga-
nizational crime.6 1 Second, optimal penalty proponents contend that
classical deterrence makes no allowance for the possibility that the or-
ganizational offender will underestimate the probability of detection
and conviction.2 To do so, they argue, would require increasing the
penalty by an arbitrary amount, again leading to overdeterrence 3
According to its advocates, the optimal penalty model achieves the
goals of criminal sentencing more effectively and efficiently than does
classical deterrence.64 They argue that because the loss resulting from
organizational crimes generally will exceed the resultant gain, the opti-
mal penalty model provides a principled and efficient method of avoid-
ing underdeterrence and overdeterrence 5 Further, to the extent that
the societal harm flowing from crime is an accurate measure of the se-
verity of the offense, the optimal penalty rule strikes a balance between
deterrence and just punishment by imposing penalties proportionate to
the harm inflicted.6 Finally, the optimal penalty model achieves reha-
bilitation and public protection by providing incentives for the organi-
zation to make the necessary internal adjustments to prevent violations
of the law. 7 Optimal penalty advocates argue that if the organization
nevertheless fails to undertake such internal adjustments itself, it even-
tually would be fined into bankruptcy. The organization then would be
rehabilitated through reorganization or incapacitated through liquida-
tion. 8 Although neo-classical economists differ as to the proper method
of determining monetary sanctions, they agree on the exclusive use of
monetary sanctions, and both groups oppose unduly intrusive, non-
monetary sanctions like probation. 9
59. Id. at 37.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 35-46.
65. See id. at 40-42.
66. See id. at 42-45.
67. See id. at 45-46.
68. See id. at 46.
69. See Posner, Economic Analysis at 398 (cited in note 9) (stating that white collar crimes
can be punished exclusively by fines and that fines are the only available sanction for
corporations).
1993] 205
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2. The Organization Theory Approach 0
Organizational theorists argue that organizational reality does not
conform to the simplistic assumptions of the economists and thus that
monetary sanctions alone cannot effectively deter organizational crime.
The organizational theorists' arguments against the economic models
fall into three general categories: (1) arguments that fines are ineffective
generally; (2) arguments that organizations are not always profit maxi-
mizers; and (3) arguments that organizations are not always rational.
a. Arguments That Fines Generally Are Ineffective7 1
The principle argument that fines generally are ineffective is that,
although management usually is responsible for organizational crimes,
fines affect management only indirectly while directly affecting several
classes of "innocents"-shareholders, 72 creditors, employees, suppliers,
and customers.73 The corrective force of fines is dissipated to the extent
that they "spill over" on or are "passed on" to groups powerless to
avoid future violations.74 Economists argue that this so-called "spill-
over effect" is a myth.75 According to the economists, spill-over effects
will occur only to the extent that the affected group was enjoying a ben-
efit from the organization's illegal activity, a benefit corresponding to
an external cost previously imposed on the victims of crimes.76 Rather
than unjustly penalizing the "innocent," therefore, the economists be-
lieve that fines restore efficient resource allocation.77
A second argument that fines are ineffective, related to the spill-
over argument, is that legislators will be reluctant to authorize large
70. See generally Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime at 43-73 (cited in note 3); Stone,
Where the Law Ends 35-57 (cited in note 12).
71. See generally Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 388-407 (cited in note 17); Gruner, 16 Am. J.
Crim. L. at 4-5 (cited in note 18); Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime at 124-26.
72. If market conditions do not allow the organization to "pass on" the burden to consumers
via higher prices, shareholders will bear the main burden of fines. Moreover, the effective separa-
tion of ownership and control in today's large publicly held corporations means that the sharehold-
ers generally were not responsible for the offense. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at
327 & nn.33-34 (cited in note 48).
73. See id. at 327; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 401-02. The feasibility of passing on fines to
consumers is a hotly contested question. For the view that pass-ons are rarely if ever possible see
Christopher Kennedy, Note, Criminal Sentences for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mecha-
nisms, 73 Cal L. Rev. 443, 443 (1985); Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 49-50 (cited
in note 10).
74. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 327; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 401-02.
75. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 48-49; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am.
Bus. L. J. at 328-29.
76. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 48-49; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am.
Bus. L. J. at 328-29.
77. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 48-49; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am.
Bus. L. J. at 328-29.
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fines that may fall disproportionately on innocent groups. Further, so
the argument goes, even when large fines are authorized judges and ju-
ries will nullify them by failing to impose them. 8
A third argument is that statutory limits on maximum fines often
have prevented the imposition of fines that are sufficient to deter
crime.79 Fourth, given historical fine levels, organizations with ample
cash flows and assets have disregarded fines as mere costs of doing busi-
ness.as These organizations consider these fines insignificant in compari-
son to the more urgent business forces driving managerial decision-
making.8 1
A fifth argument is that an inherent limit on the effectiveness of
fines is the wealth of the defendant.8 2 When the probability of detection
is so low that a fine equal to the expected gain from the offense would
exceed the total wealth of the organization, a fine cannot deter commis-
sion of the offense.8 Because organizational crimes often affect victims
indirectly and because organizational crimes often require an element
of intent, which often is difficult to prove in cases of regulatory offenses,
the probability of detection, let alone conviction, is quite low for many
organizational crimes.84
Sixth, under certain circumstances fines may achieve deterrence at
the expense of other sentencing goals, most notably just punishment.88
Seventh, even if fines set at the appropriate level would effectively de-
78. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 330-31; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 405-
07 (cited in note 17). Coffee states:
Empirical studies show that the fines in the typical antitrust case seldom approach the au-
thorized maximum.... [Bletween 1967 and 1970 when the maximum fine was a lowly $50,000
per count, the Justice Department recommended the imposition of the maximum fine in less
than a third of the cases where it obtained convictions.
Id. at 405-06 (cited in note 17).
79. See Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 5 & n.6 (cited in note 18).
80. See Clinard & Yeager, Corporate Crime at 124-26 (cited in note 3). The largest fine re-
sulting from the great electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy of the 1950s, the $437,500 fine
imposed on General Electric, amounted to only 0.1% of General Electric's total profit. Coffee, 79
Mich. L. Rev. at 405. A study of sentences imposed on organizational defendants in federal courts
between 1984 and 1987, commissioned by the United States Sentencing Commission, found that of
825 organizations convicted of nonantitrust offenses, 48% were fined less than $5,000, 80% were
fined $25,000 or less, and only two percent were fined more than $500,000. Mark A. Cohen, et al.,
Organizations as Defendants in Federal Court: A Preliminary Analysis of Prosecutions, Convic-
tions, and Sanctions, 1984-1987, 10 Whittier L. Rev. 103, 107 (1988).
81. See Stone, Where the Law Ends at 39-46 (cited in note 12).
82. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 329-30 & n.46; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev.
at 389-93; Posner, Economic Analysis at 398 (cited in note 9).
83. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 329-30 & n.46; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev.
at 389-93; Posner, Economic Analysis at 398.
84. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 392.
85. See Note, Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1227, 1251-52
(1979).
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ter organizational crime, organizational theorists contend that the im-
possibility of calculating the relevant variables with mathematical
precision renders optimal fines unattainable. This impossibility, they
argue, causes decision makers to overestimate the optimal fine, thus
causing inefficient overdeterrence e6 Finally, organizational theorists ar-
gue that exclusive reliance on monetary sanctions creates the percep-
tion that organizational crime is permissible provided the organization
is willing to pay the price.8 7
b. Arguments That Organizations Are Not Always Profit
Maximizers
Whereas the neo-classical economist tends to view the organization
as a black box, the organizational theorist views organizations as collec-
tions of individual agents whose goals and motivations may deviate
from those of the organizational entity as a whole. 8 In the modern pub-
licly held corporation, ownership is separated from control,8 strategic
planning is separated from operational control,90 and most corporate
functions are highly specialized, departmentalized, and therefore, sepa-
rated from one another. As a result, individual actors within the organi-
zation can lose sight of the overall profit motive and focus instead on
other goals. An organization's agent may violate the law, disregarding
the best interests of the organization, when necessary to serve his own
immediate interests.91 Agent interests such as promotions, incentive
compensation, or concealing mistakes from management may trump the
interests of the organization in the agent's decisionmaking9 2 Further,
the possibilities that the agent will have changed jobs by the time the
violation is detected or that the violation will not be traceable to the
individual agent allow the agent to reap personal gain at the organiza-
tion's expense.9 3
Empirical evidence suggests that managers are more likely to
86. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Richard Gruner, and Christopher D. Stone, Standards for Orga-
nizational Probation: A Proposal to the United States Sentencing Commission, 10 Whittier L.
Rev. 77, 79-80 (1988).
87. Id. at 82.
88. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 393; Gruner, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. at 5 & n.8 (cited in note
18).
89. See Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (Harcourt, Brace & World, rev. ed. 1968).
90. Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 348 (cited in note 48).
91. See id. at 339-41; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 393-94.
92. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 339-41; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 393-
94.
93. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 339-41; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 393-
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"satisfice" than to maximize profits." That is, in the real world, manag-
ers lack perfect information and thus will accept the first solution that
satisfies certain minimum criteria rather than search for the optimal
solution.9 5 Managers that satisfice may then pursue other discretionary
goals such as innovation, growth, employee financial well-being, and or-
ganizational prestige.' Satisficing is most feasible for managers in large,
well established firms, in less than perfectly competitive industries. 7
c. Arguments That Organizations Are Not Always Rational
Arguments that organizations are not always rational fall into two
general categories: (1) those pertaining to the behavior of individuals
within organizations and (2) those pertaining to the organizational
structure of organizations. Many organizations have a distinct culture.
Occasionally organizations and even entire industries will exhibit cul-
tures that are fertile for violations of the law. 8 Although such cultural
predispositions may not always be irrational, two other phenomena in
organizations generally are irrational. First, agents making decisions in
groups may underestimate the probability of detection or be less risk
averse than agents acting individually, a phenomenon known as "risky
shift."'" Second, decisionmaking groups sometimes seek consensus at
the expense of critical assessments of available options, a phenomenon
known as "groupthink."' 100 The facts that many organizational decisions
are made by groups, such as committees, and that the probability of
detection generally is not empirically measurable and, therefore, is a
function of the perpetrator's perceptions, suggest that these phenomena
may account for violations of the law that are not in the organization's
best interests.1"'
Organizational size and structure also can result in actions that are
not rational in terms of the best interests of the overall organization.
The highly centralized, hierarchical control structures of many large
corporations inevitably suffer from internal communication problems
94. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 395-96 & n.33; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J.
at 341.
95. Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 395-96 & n.33; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at
341.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Id. at 342-44; Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime at 43-44, 58 (cited in note 3);
Stone, Where the Law Ends at 67 (cited in note 12).
99. Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 344-45.
100. See generally Irving Janis, Groupthink, in Barry M. Staw, ed., Psychological Founda-
tions of Organizational Behavior 406 (Scott, Foresman, 1977); Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus.
L. J. at 345; Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 394-95.
101. Id.
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and intraorganizational parochialism." 2 Empirical evidence suggests
that an individual's primary loyalty within an organization is to his im-
mediate work group, not the organization as a whole. 103
In addition, the decentralized, multi-divisional structure of many
modern public corporations creates perverse incentives for lower level
management to break the law.104 In such organizations, top manage-
ment performs strategic planning, setting production and profit quotas
for the various operational divisions, while lower and middle manage-
ment retain almost complete control over operations.0 5 This situation
presents the possibility that top management, isolated from the reali-
ties of operations, will make unreasonable demands on lower and mid-
dle management that can be met only by breaking the law. 0 6
Furthermore, top management may prefer to remain ignorant of lower
level crime, thus reaping its benefits without incurring personal liabil-
ity.10 7 This phenomenon may help explain why most corporate crimes
are committed by lower and middle level management rather than top
management. 08
Because of the foregoing arguments, organizational theorists be-
lieve organizational fines alone are not sufficient to prevent organiza-
tional crime. One option that organizational theorists favor is imposing
criminal sanctions on individual actors involved in organizational
crimes. 09 They argue that targeting responsible individuals avoids the
danger of spill-over effects on innocent persons and focuses the brunt of
the sanction on those organizational actors who most need to be de-
terred.1 0 Although organizational theorists believe that individuals
should be sanctioned whenever possible, they maintain that sanctions
must focus primarily on the organizational entity for the following rea-
sons. First, some organizational crimes result totally from intraorganiza-
tional bureaucratic failures and are not attributable to any particular
individuals."' Second, tracing an offense to a particular organization
often is relatively easy but identifying the responsible individuals in the
organization is often extremely difficult." 2 Third, if only individuals
102. Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 345-48.
103. Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 396-97.
104. See id. at 397-99; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 348-50.
105. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 397; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 348.
106. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 398-99; Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 349-
50.
107. See Coffee, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 400.
108. See id. at 397.
109. See Metzger and Schwenk, 28 Am. Bus. L. J. at 332-35.
110. Id. at 332-33.
111. Id. at 333.
112. Id. at 333-34.
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were punished, organizations could perversely encourage criminal acts
in order to enjoy the benefits of the acts without bearing the liability.113
Fourth, punishing only individuals would not correct the institutional
factors contributing to violations of the law. " Finally, punishing both
individuals and organizations provides incentives for organizations to
police their own agents, thereby supplementing law enforcement ef-
forts." 5 For these reasons, organizational theorists would extend crimi-
nal sanctions to individuals as well as organizations.
Organizational theorists also would use organizational probation to
require organizations to investigate the precise causes of their crimes
and to develop and implement programs to prevent and detect recur-
rences of those crimes. According to organization theorists, probation
presents an economical means of focusing sanctions on the source of
organizational crime without incurring the problems associated with
large fines." 6 In the midst of these competing views of organizational
behavior, the United States Sentencing Commission began its work of
promulgating sentencing guidelines for organizational defendants.
III. THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent com-
mission within the judicial branch of the United States." 7 Congress es-
tablished the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines and
policy statements for the federal criminal justice system" 8 that would
achieve the four goals of sentencing," 9 provide certainty and fairness in
achieving those goals, avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records and convicted of similar criminal con-
duct,12 0 and reflect advancement in the knowledge of human behavior
as it relates to the criminal justice process.' Although not expressly
charged with promulgating sentencing guidelines for organizational de-
fendants, the Commission bases its authority to do so on the facts that:
(1) Congress did not expressly deny it such authority; (2) the Act, the
Commission's enabling statute, provides judicial authority and direction
for the sentencing of both individuals and organizations; (3) the statu-
tory purposes for sentencing guidelines apply to both organizations and
113. Id. at 334-35.
114. Id. at 335.
115. Id. at 335-36.
116. Coffee, Gruner, and Stone, 10 Whittier L. Rev. at 79-80 (cited in note 86).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988). The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)-(2).
119. Id. § 991(b)(1)(A).
120. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
121. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
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to individuals; and (4) Congress granted the Commission broad latitude
in determining how to design guidelines that best achieve those
purposes.'22
Because the Act placed a priority on the promulgation of sentenc-
ing guidelines for individuals, the Commission's initial guidelines, sub-
mitted to Congress in 1987, dealt almost exclusively with individual
sentencing.' The only guidelines for organizational defendants in-
cluded in the initial guidelines were those pertaining to antitrust of-
fenses.' 2 4 Thus, with the exception of these antitrust guidelines, no
guidelines for organizational offenses existed until the current guide-
lines for organizational defendants became effective on November 1,
1991.
A. Prior Draft Proposals of Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizational Defendants
Before ultimately promulgating the Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission considered a series of discussion drafts and draft propos-
als. In 1988, the Sentencing Commission circulated two different discus-
sion drafts of organizational sentencing guidelines for public comment.
One draft, written by the Commission's staff, embodied the "optimal
penalty" variation of the economic approach to organizational sanc-
tions. The other draft, written by three law professors, called for the
extensive use of probation.
The draft developed by the Commission's staff sought to achieve
the goals of sentencing by imposing sanctions designed to minimize the
total costs of organizational crime. This draft, which essentially embod-
ied the "optimal penalty" version of the economics approach,'25 set
monetary penalties equal to the total loss reasonably likely to result
from the offense discounted by the probability of detection plus reason-
able enforcement costs.' 26 The draft viewed monetary penalties as ade-
quate127 and authorized probation only to ensure payment of monetary
penalties or performance of notice to victims. However, in extreme
cases such as repeated felony violations involving senior management,
122. Oversight on the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Guidelines for Organizational Sanc-
tions, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 2d Sess. at 179-80 (1990) (testimony of Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman
United States Sentencing Commission) ("Oversight").
123. Id. at 181-83.
124. Id. at 182-83. Antitrust offenses account for 25% of all organizational convictions. Id. at
183.
125. See notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
126. United States Sentencing Commission, Discussion Draft of Sentencing Guidelines and
Policy Statements for Organizations, 10 Whittier L. Rev. 7, 9-13, 49-50 (1988).
127. Id. at 9.
212 [Vol. 46:197
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
the draft required that the organization develop and implement an ef-
fective program to prevent and detect the misconduct.128
Under this draft, all restitution, forfeitures, and fines would count
toward satisfaction of the total monetary penalty.129 Furthermore, all
criminal, civil, and administrative penalties against the organization
and any individuals within the organization arising from the same un-
lawful conduct would be coordinated so that the total sanctions did not
exceed the total loss resulting from the unlawful conduct. °30 Also, this
draft would not allow an organization's inability to pay to constitute
grounds for reducing the minimum total monetary penalty. Thus, this
draft created the possibility that some organizations might have to file
for bankruptcy as a result of the sanctions imposed upon them.13 Fi-
nally, this draft would have covered all types of organizational of-
fenses.13 2 Ultimately, the Commission rejected this draft, authored by
its staff, because it was too complicated and would underpunish when
there was no measurable amount of loss. 3
The other discussion draft circulated by the Commission in 1988
dealt exclusively with proposed guidelines for probation. This draft, au-
thored by three law school professors, viewed probation as a necessary
supplement to monetary sanctions.13 4 It essentially embodied the orga-
nizational theory approach. 3 5
These proposed probation guidelines would have required proba-
tion for serious offenses-all felonies and those misdemeanors that
threatened human health or safety or comprised a pattern of criminal
behavior-when the court also found one of the following: (1) that man-
agement policies or practices of the organization, including any inade-
quacies in its internal controls, encouraged, facilitated, or substantially
contributed to the criminal behavior or delayed its detection, and that
such policies or practices had not been corrected in a manner that made
repetition of the same or similar behavior highly unlikely; (2) that the
circumstances surrounding the offense, including the possible involve-
ment of senior organizational officials, had not been adequately clari-
fied, and the failure to obtain such clarification was likely to diminish
respect for the law, hinder internal accountability, or otherwise be con-
128. Id. at 13-15, 64-69.
129. Id. at 12-13, 50-55.
130. Id. at 15-16, 61-62.
131. Id. at 55-57.
132. See id. at 20-41.
133. Oversight at 184, 208-09 (cited in note 122) (Chairman Judge Wilkins describing the
discussion draft as too complex and underpunishing serious crime when there was no measurable
amount of loss).
134. Coffee, Gruner, and Stone, 10 Whittier L. Rev. at 78-79 (cited in note 86).
135. See notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
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trary to the public interest; or (3) that probation was necessary to im-
pose an order of restitution or community service or to ensure
compliance with any other portion of the sentence.' If probation was
imposed under (1) above, this draft recommended that a condition of
probation require the organization, or if necessary a probation officer, to
develop and implement a plan to correct the identified policies, prac-
tices, or inadequacies and to communicate the terms of the program
and the conditions of probation to all relevant personnel.137 Thus, this
draft expanded the use of probation beyond that provided in the Com-
mission staff's discussion draft.
In November of 1989, the Commission published a draft proposal
for public comment in the Federal Register. 3 8 The proposal provided
for both monetary sanctions and probation.3 9 The provisions of the
draft proposal covering restitution, remediation, and community service
ultimately were adopted in substantially the same form in the 1991
Guidelines.140
This draft proposal provided two methods of determining fines.
Under the first option (Option I), the court would determine a base fine
equal to the greater of the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, the
pecuniary gain to the defendant from the offense, or the amount con-
tained in an offense level fine table.' 4 ' The fine table ranged from a fine
of $500 for an offense level of one to a fine of $25 million for an offense
level of forty or more.' 42 The court then would adjust this base fine
upward or downward by specified percentages according to the presence
or absence of various aggravating and mitigating factors. 43 Depending
on which factors were present, the adjusted base fine could range from
twenty percent of the initial base fine to 190 percent of the initial base
fine. 144 The final fine range would then be from 200 to 300 percent of
136. Coffee, Gruner, and Stone, 10 Whittier L. Rev. at 82-83 (cited in note 86).
137. Id. at 91-92.
138. 54 Fed. Reg., 47056, 47056 (Nov. 8, 1989).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 47057-58; notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
141. 54 Fed. Reg. at 47058.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 47058-59. The aggravating factors included whether management was involved in
the offense, whether there was a record of prior similar misconduct, whether the offense violated a
judicial order or order of probation, whether management was involved in obstructing the investi-
gation or prosecution, whether the offense involved official corruption, whether the offense
targeted a vulnerable victim, whether the offense threatened a financial or consumer market, and
whether the offense threatened national security. The mitigating factors included whether the or-
ganization voluntarily disclosed the offense prior to an imminent threat of government investiga-
tion, whether high-level management was reasonably ignorant of the offense, whether the offense
occurred despite bona fide organizational programs and policies designed to prevent law violations,
and whether the organization took substantial steps to prevent a repetition of similar offenses. Id.
144. Id.
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the adjusted base fine. 14 5
Under the second option (Option II), the court would determine
the fine range solely by reference to an offense level fine table.14" In this
table, an offense level of one corresponded to a fine range of $250-$500,
and an offense level of thirty-two or more corresponded to a fine range
of $200 to $374 million.147 This option employed the same aggravating
and mitigating factors as Option I but in a slightly different manner.141
Under Option II, the court would increase the offense level by one level
for each aggravating factor and decrease the offense level by one level
for each mitigating factor. 4 9
Several aspects of the 1989 proposal's fine guidelines related to
both fine options. The 1989 proposal contained policy statements per-
taining to the determination of the fine within the fine range150 and
possible departures from the fine range.' 5' It also contained a guideline
permitting reductions in fines based on the defendant's inability to
pay.152 Finally, in the case of closely held organizations, it contained a
guideline allowing fines assessed against the individual owners to be off-
set against fines assessed against the organization.15 3
The 1989 proposal required probation in the following situations:
(1) when necessary as a mechanism to impose another sentence, (2)
when any monetary penalty had not been paid by the time of sentenc-
ing, (3) when the organization or its high-level management had been
convicted of a similar criminal offense within the previous five years
and prior to the offense of conviction, (4) when the offense indicated a
significant problem with the organization's policies or procedures for
preventing crimes, and (5) when probation would significantly increase
the likelihood of future compliance with the law.154 The 1989 proposal
also included a policy statement listing recommended conditions of pro-
bation similar to those in the 1991 Guidelines. 55
145. Id. at 47058.
146. Id. at 47060.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 47059-60.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 47060-61.
151. Id. at 47061-62.
152. Id. at 47061.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 47062.
155. Id. at 47062-63. The conditions recommended in the 1989 proposal differed from those
ultimately included in the 1991 Guidelines in two important respects. First, the 1989 proposal
recommended that when probation was imposed to ensure payment of monetary penalties, the
court should include a condition prohibiting the defendant from undertaking any of a long list of
activities-including paying dividends, issuing securities, merging, consolidating, reorganizing, and
refinancing-without the prior approval of the court. Second, when the court imposed a probation
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In November of 1990, the Sentencing Commission published a sec-
ond draft proposal of organizational guidelines along with a competing
proposal drafted by the Department of Justice. 5" The primary differ-
ence between the 1990 proposal and the 1989 proposal was with respect
to fines. Like Option I in the 1989 proposal, the 1990 proposal required
the court to determine a base fine equal to the greater of the pecuniary
loss, pecuniary gain, or amount listed in an offense level fine table. 157
The 1990 proposal contained three alternative fine tables.'58 The fines
in Alternative A ranged from $5,000 for an offense level of four or less
to $165 million for an offense level of forty or more. 59 The fines in Al-
ternative B ranged from $3,300 for an offense level of four or less to $60
million for an offense level of forty or more. 60 The fines in Alternative
C ranged from $4,150 for an offense level of four or less to $115 million
for an offense level of forty or more.'6 '
Unlike the 1989 proposal, however, the 1990 proposal specified only
mitigating factors. 62 The court would total the points associated with
each relevant mitigating factor to determine a mitigation score. 163 The
condition requiring the defendant to develop a program to prevent and detect future law viola-
tions, the 1989 proposal recommended that such programs seek to prevent and detect misconduct
similar to the offense of conviction. Id. at 47062. The 1991 Guidelines, in contrast, recommend that
such programs seek to prevent and detect law violations generally. See notes 220, 223-24 and ac-
companying text.
156. 55 Fed. Reg. 46600, 46600 (Nov. 5, 1990). Although the Commission had hoped to sub-
mit proposed sentencing guidelines for organizational defendants to Congress by May 1, 1990, the
announcement by commissioner Judge George MacKinnon on April 10 that he would not vote to
submit organizational guidelines to Congress until the three vacancies on the Commission had
been filled caused the Commission to delay submitting organizational guidelines until the next
amendment cycle. Oversight at 185-86 (cited in note 122). The coincidence of Judge MacKinnon's
announcement and the abrupt withdrawal by the Department of Justice of its support for the
promulgation of organizational guidelines, as opposed to the mere policy statements advocated by
various business interests, gave rise to speculation that the Sentencing Commission may be caving
in to pro-business pressure from the Bush administration. Id. at 198. The perception that the
Commission may be bowing to business interests gained strength from stories that the Commission
was considering a new proposal that would result in lower fines and make probation completely
discretionary rather than sometimes mandatory. See Fred Strasser, Lighter Corporate Sentencing?
12 Nat'l L. J. 3, 38 (Apr. 9, 1990).
157. 55 Fed. Reg. at 46603.
158. Id. at 46603-04.
159. Id. at 46603.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 46603-04.
162. See id. at 46604. Since organizational defendants have better access to information re-
garding their culpability than does the government, the Commission reasoned that placing the
entire burden of disproving culpability upon the organizational defendant would be more efficient.
See Strasser, 12 Nat'l L. J. at 38 (cited in note 156).
163. 55 Fed. Reg. at 46604. The mitigation factors and their associated values included: (1)
four points when the organization disclosed its crime to law enforcement prior to any imminent
threat of a government investigation; (2) three points when both prior to and after the offense the
organization maintained an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law; (3) two
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court would then apply minimum and maximum multipliers, corre-
sponding to the mitigation score on a multiplier table, to the base fine
to determine the fine range.164 When no mitigation factors applied,
thereby making the mitigation score zero, the minimum and maximum
multipliers would be two and three, respectively. 165 When all of the mit-
igation factors applied, thereby making the mitigation score nine, the
minimum and maximum multipliers would be 0.15 and 0.25, respec-
tively. 68 The 1990 proposal also specified more factors to consider in
determining the fine within the range"e and more bases for departures
from the fine range than did the 1989 proposal.168
The 1990 proposal would have required probation only when neces-
sary to impose another sentence, to ensure payment of monetary penal-
ties, or to ensure changes within the organization to reduce the
likelihood of future criminal conduct.'6 9 The 1990 proposal's policy
statement regarding recommended probation conditions was substan-
tially the same as the policy statement of the 1989 proposal.1 70
The 1990 Department of Justice proposal, which the Commission
published simultaneously with its own proposal, was essentially the
Commission's 1989 proposal, using Option II to determine fines.' 7, On
May 1, 1991, the Sentencing Commission submitted the final version of
its organizational guidelines to Congress. 17 2 These guidelines became ef-
fective on November 1, 1991.173
points when despite the due diligence of the organization to detect law violations, those persons
within the organization with policy-setting or legal compliance responsibilities or substantial man-
agerial authority neither knew of the offense at the time of its occurrence nor, upon learning of its
occurrence, failed to report the offense promptly to law enforcement; (4) two points when the
organization cooperated fully with the government's investigation of the offense; and (5) one point
when, prior to an adjudication of guilt, the organization accepted responsibility for the offense and
took prompt and reasonable steps to remedy the harm caused by the offense. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The 1990 proposal also included an alternative multiplier table that differed only in
that the highest possible mitigation score would be an eight, at which the minimum and maximum
multipliers would be 0.35 and 0.55, respectively. Id. at 46606.
167. Id. at 46606-07.
168. Id. at 46608-09. Most of the aggravating factors under the 1989 proposal were bases for
upward departures from the fine range under the 1990 proposal. See id.; note 142 and accompany-
ing text.
169. 55 Fed. Reg. at 46609-10.
170. See id. at 46610. One notable difference, however, is that it omitted the recommended
condition requiring court approval for dividends, securities issues, etc. See note 154 and accompa-
nying text.
171. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 46611-15; notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
172. 56 Fed. Reg. at 22762-96.
173. See note 2 and accompanying text.
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B. The 1991 Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants
According to the introductory comments, the Commission intended
that the guidelines, together with criminal sanctions imposed on organi-
zations' agents in their individual capacities, would provide just punish-
ment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain
internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal
conduct.174 The principal sanctions contained in the Guidelines are
remediation of the harm caused by criminal conduct, fines, and
probation. 175
1. Remedying Harm From the Offense
As a general principle, the Guidelines require that an organization
remedy any harm caused by its offense. 17 6 Moreover, resources ex-
pended in remedying harm are not to be considered punishment or de-
ducted from fines otherwise assessed. 7 7 The Guidelines specify four
means of remedying the harm from criminal conduct-restitution, re-
medial orders, community service, and orders of notice to victims. If the
victims of an organization's offense are identifiable, the Guidelines re-
quire an order of restitution either as a separate sentence or as a condi-
tion of probation. 78 When restitution is unavailable or inadequate to
remedy the harm, the Guidelines authorize but do not require the sen-
tencing court to order remediation or community service as conditions
of probation. 79 The Guidelines do restrict the use of orders of remedia-
tion and community service to reparation of the harm already caused
by the offense or to prevention of future harm from the instant of-
fense.' 80 When some victims have not been identified, the Guidelines
authorize courts to order notice to victims.' 8 '
174. U.S.S.G. Ch. 8, intro, comment. at 347 (1991).
175. The guidelines apply only to organizations convicted of felonies or Class A misdemean-
ors. Id. § 8A1.1 at 349.
176. See id. Ch. 8, intro. comment. at 347. The sentencing court may refrain from ordering
remediation only when to do so would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process. Id. §
8B1.1(b) at 355.
177. Id. Ch. 8, intro, comment. at 347.
178. Id. § 8B1.1(a) at 355, Ch. 8, Pt.B, intro, comment. at 355. The Guidelines require the
court to order restitution if authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64 (1988). U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1(a)(1)
at 355. If restitution would be authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64 but for the fact that the
offense of conviction is not an offense set forth in title 18, United States Code, or 49 U.S.C. § 1472
(h), (i), (j), or (n), the Guidelines require the court to sentence the organization to probation with a
condition requiring restitution. U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1(a)(2) at 355.
179. U.S.S.G. § 8B1.2 at 355-56, § 8B1.3 at 356.
180. Id. §§ 8B1.2 cmt. at 355-56, 8B1.3, comment. at 356.
181. Id. § 8B1.4 at 356-57.
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2. Fines
When the court determines that the organizational defendant oper-
ated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means,
the Guidelines require the imposition of a fine sufficient to divest the
organization of all of its net assets.18 2 In the case of all other organiza-
tional defendants, the Guidelines specify how the sentencing court
should determine the appropriate fine for certain enumerated of-
fenses.183 For offenses not enumerated in the Guidelines, the court must
determine the fine by applying the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sections
3553 and 3572.14
For offenses covered by the Guidelines, courts are to determine a
fine range based on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of
the organization.'88 Specifically, the Guidelines require that in order to
determine the fine range, the court must multiply the base fine by the
minimum and maximum multipliers corresponding to the organization's
culpability score.' 6 The base fine is the greatest of: (1) the amount in-
dicated by the offense level fine table, (2) the pecuniary gain to the
organization from the offense, or (3) the pecuniary loss caused by the
offense, to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.'8 7 The fines on the offense level fine table range from $5,000
for an offense level of six or less to $72.5 million for offense levels of
thirty-eight or more."'8 The culpability score is the initial score of five
adjusted upward or downward on the basis of certain specified fac-
tors.'89 Circumstances resulting in upward adjustments include involve-
ment in or tolerance of the illegal activity by management, past
misconduct similar to the instant offense, violations of judicial orders or
conditions of probation resulting from the instant offense, and obstruc-
182. Id. § 8C1.1 at 357.
183. Id. § 8C2.1 at 357-58. In general, the offenses covered by the Guidelines' fine provisions
include: most offenses involving property; most offenses involving public officials; some offenses
against drugs; some offenses involving criminal enterprises and racketeering; offenses of fraud and
deceit; offenses of insider trading; some offenses involving public safety; offenses against odometer
laws and regulations; antitrust offenses; offenses involving money laundering and monetary trans-
action reporting; and offenses involving taxation. The offenses that the Guidelines' fine provisions
generally do not cover include: offenses against the person; offenses involving individual rights;
offenses involving the administration of justice; offenses involving national defense; offenses in-
volving food, drugs, and -agricultural products laws; and offenses involving the environment. Id.
184. Id. § 8C2.10 at 371.
185. Id. Ch. 8, intro, comment, at 347.
186. Id. § 8C2.7 at 368.
187. Id. § 8C2.4(a) at 360-62. When calculation of pecuniary gain or loss would unduly pro-
long or complicate the sentencing process, the base fine should be determined based solely on the
offense level fine table. Id. § 8C2.4(c) at 360.
188. Id. § 8C2.4(d) at 360-61. The offense levels for organizations are the same as those speci-
fied for individual defendants in id. Ch. 2 at 29-234. See id. § 8C2.3 at 359.
189. Id. § 8C2.5 at 362-68.
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tion of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense.190
The amount of the upward adjustment for management involve-
ment is a function of the level of the management involved, the perva-
siveness of involvement at that level, and the size of the organization or
organizational subunit involved. 9 ' Thus, when high-level personnel19 2
participated in, condoned, or were willfully ignorant of the offense or
when tolerance of the offense by substantial authority personnel193 was
pervasive, and when the organization or subunit involved consisted of
at least 5,000, 1,000, or 200 employees, the required upward adjustment
would be five, four, or three points, respectively. 94 When substantial
authority personnel participated in, condoned, or were willfully igno-
rant of the offense and when the organization or unit involved consisted
of at least fifty or ten employees, the required addition would be two or
one points, respectively. 9 5 The upward adjustment for past similar mis-
conduct is either one or two points depending primarily on whether the
prior conduct occurred within ten or five years of the instant offense."96
The upward adjustments for violations of judicial orders and conditions
of probation are two and one points, respectively. 97 The upward adjust-
ment for obstruction is three points. 9 s
Circumstances that will result in downward adjustments of the cul-
pability score include the existence of an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of lawl'9 and self-disclosure of, cooperation in the
investigation of, and acceptance of responsibility for the offense.20 0 The
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. "'High-level personnel of the organization' means individuals who have substantial con-
trol over the organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organi-
zation. The term includes: a director; an executive officer; an individual in charge of a major
business or functional unit of the organization, such as sales, administration, or finance; and an
individual with a substantial ownership interest." Id. § 8A1.2, comment. n.3(b) at 351. "With re-
spect to a unit with 200 or more employees, 'high-level personnel of a unit of the organization'
means agents within the unit who set the policy for or control that unit." Id. § 8C2.5, comment. n.3
at 351-53.
193. "'Substantial authority personnel' means individuals who within the scope of their au-
thority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of the organization." Id. §
8A1.2, comment. n.3(c) at 351-53.
194. Id. § 8C2.5 at 362.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. A prevention and detection program is not effective if personnel responsible for its ad-
ministration or enforcement or if any high-level personnel participated in, condoned, or were will-
fully ignorant of the offense or if the organization, upon learning of the offense, unreasonably
delayed reporting the offense to the proper authorities. Id.
200. Id.
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downward adjustment for an effective plan is three points. 01 If the or-
ganization reports the offense to appropriate government authorities
prior to the imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation
and within a reasonably prompt time after learning of the offense, fully
cooperates in the investigation, and clearly demonstrates recognition
and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, the
downward adjustment is five points. 02 If the organization merely coop-
erates and accepts responsibility, the downward adjustment is two
points, and if the organization only accepts responsibility, the down-
ward adjustment is one point.03
After adjusting the initial culpability score of five upward and
downward according to the presence or absence of the above mentioned
factors, the resulting culpability score determines what maximum and
minimum multipliers will be applied to the base fine to determine the
fine range.20 At one extreme, a culpability score of ten or higher results
in a minimum multiplier of two and a maximum multiplier of four.20 5
As a result, the fine range for an offense having a base fine of $100,000
would be $200,000 to $400,000. At the other extreme, a culpability score
of zero or less would result in a minimum multiplier of 0.05 and a maxi-
mum multiplier of 0.2.206 Hence, the fine range for the same offense
having a base fine of $100,000 would be $5,000 to $20,000. As this exam-
ple illustrates, the culpability score can result in substantial variations
in the fine range. At the middle of the culpability score continuum, a
culpability score of five would result in a minimum multiplier of one
and a maximum multiplier of two. 07 The rest of the culpability scores
between zero and ten result in minimum multipliers evenly distributed
between 0.05 and 2.0 and maximum multipliers evenly distributed be-
tween 0.2 and 4.0.208 Since the minimum multipliers always are greater
than zero, an organizational defendant cannot escape a fine altogether
through downward adjustments of the culpability score.
Once the fine range is determined, the sentencing court must deter-
mine the fine amount within the range.20 9 The Guidelines include a pol-
icy statement setting forth factors that the court should consider in
determining the fine within the range.21 0
201. Id.
202. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1) at 365.
203. Id. § 8c2.5(g)(2)-(3) at 365.
204. Id. § 8C2.6 at 368.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. § 8C2.8 at 369.
210. Id. These factors include: (1) the purposes of sentencing; (2) the organization's role in
19931
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Once the court has determined the fine within the range, it must
determine the final fine by adjusting the fine by any necessary disgorge-
ment.211 The Guidelines require that any gain to the organization from
the offense that will not be paid as restitution or other remedial mea-
sure must be added to the fine as disgorgement.212
Fines are payable immediately unless the court finds that the or-
ganization is not a criminal purpose organization and that immediate
payment would unduly burden the organization. 13 In such cases, pay-
ment shall be completed as soon as possible and in no event more than
five years after assessment.2 14
The Guidelines specify certain circumstances when a fine other
than that determined by the process just described should be imposed.
If the Guideline fine exceeds the maximum fine authorized by statute,
the statutory maximum should be the Guideline fine.2 15 If the Guideline
fine would impair the organization's ability to make restitution, the
court should reduce the Guideline fine enough to avoid such impair-
ment.218 Similarly, if the organization would be unable to pay the mini-
mum Guideline fine, the court should reduce the Guideline fine enough
to avoid jeopardizing the continued viability of the organization.1 7
When the organization is a closely held organization and when one or
more individuals, each of whom owns at least a five percent interest in
the organization, has been fined in a federal criminal proceeding for the
same offense for which the organization is being sentenced, the court
may offset the organization's fine by no more than the total amount of
the individuals' fines multiplied by their total percentage interest in the
organization."' The Guidelines also authorize upward and downward
the offense; (3) collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the
organization's conduct; (4) any nonpecuniary loss caused or threatened by the offense; (5) whether
the offense involved a vulnerable victim; (6) any prior criminal records of high-level personnel who
participated in, condoned, or were willfully ignorant of the instant offense; (7) any prior criminal
or civil misconduct by the organization not already reflected in the culpability score; (8) any culpa-
bility score lower than zero or higher than ten; (9) partial but incomplete satisfaction of one or
more of the conditions necessary for upward or downward adjustments of the culpability score;
(10) any factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988); and (11) the relative importance of any factor
used to determine the fine range, including the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, the pecuniary
gain from the offense, any specific offense characteristic used to determine the offense level, and
any aggravating or mitigating factor used to determine the culpability score. U.S.S.G. § 8C2,8 at
369.
211. Id. § 8C2.9 at 371.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 8C3.2 at 372.
214. Id.
215. Id. § 8C3.1 at 372.
216. Id. § 8C3.3 at 373.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 8C3.4 at 373-74.
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departures from the Guideline fine when other miscellaneous factors
are met.219
3. Probation
The Guidelines require that an organization's sentence include a
term of probation when: (1) necessary to ensure that the organization
will remedy the harm through either restitution, remediation, or com-
munity service; (2) necessary to safeguard the organization's ability to
pay monetary penalties not paid at the time of sentencing; (3) at the
time of sentencing, an organization having fifty or more employees does
not have an effective program to prevent and detect law violations; (4)
the organization or any individual within high-level personnel that par-
ticipated in the instant offense, within five years prior to sentencing,
engaged in similar misconduct as determined by a prior criminal adju-
dication, and any part of the misconduct underlying the instant offense
occurred after that adjudication; (5) probation is necessary to ensure
that changes are made within the organization to reduce the likelihood
of future criminal conduct; (6) the sentence imposed on the organiza-
tion does not include a fine; or (7) probation is necessary to accomplish
one of the purposes of sentencing. 20
The Guidelines require that any sentence of probation include the
mandatory condition that the organization not commit another federal,
state, or local crime during the term of probation.221 When probation is
imposed for a felony, the Guidelines require as a second mandatory
condition the imposition of either a fine, restitution, or community ser-
219. Id. § 8C4 at 374-77. The decision to depart from the Guideline fine depends on the
relative importance of the factor in the particular case and the extent to which the factor is not
taken into account in the guideline fine. See id. § 8C4, intro, comment. at 374. Factors possibly
warranting upward departures include: (1) when the act has heightened the occurrence or risk of
death or bodily injury; (2) when the act has threatened national security; (3) when the act has
threatened the environment; (4) when the act has threatened a market; (5) when the act was an
actual or attempted corruption of a public official in connection with the instant offense; (6) when
an effective prevention and detection program resulting in a decreased culpability score was imple-
mented in response to a court or administrative order; and (7) when the organization's culpability
score is greater than ten. Factors possibly warranting downward departures include: (1) when the
organization has substantially assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of an unre-
lated defendant; (2) when the organization is a public entity; (3) when the members or benefi-
ciaries of the organization, other than shareholders of a corporation, are the direct victims of the
offense; (4) when the remedial costs incurred by the organization greatly exceed the organization's
gain; and (5) when no individual within substantial authority personnel participated in, condoned,
or was willfully ignorant of the offense, the organization at the time of the offense had an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law, and the base fine was determined according to
pecuniary loss, the offense level fine table, or a special Chapter Two instruction. Id. § 8C4 at 374-
77.
220. Id. § 8D1.l(a) at 379.
221. Id. § 8D1.3(a) at 380.
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vice, or when these conditions would be plainly unreasonable, one of the
conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3562(b). 2 2 The Guidelines authorize
the court to impose additional discretionary conditions of probation
provided that they are reasonably related to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defend-
ant and involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are
necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing.223 The discretionary pro-
bation conditions recommended by the Guidelines include orders that
the organization: (1) publicize its offense in a manner specified by the
court; (2) submit regular financial reports to the court or probation of-
ficer; (3) submit to and pay for a reasonable number of regular and
unannounced examinations of books and records and interrogations of
knowledgeable employees by probation officers or experts retained by
the court; (4) notify the court or probation officer immediately of cer-
tain events affecting the organization's financial condition or prospects;
(5) pay periodic payments; (6) develop and submit to the court a pro-
gram to prevent and detect violations of law and a schedule for its im-
plementation; (7) notify employees and shareholders of its offense and
its program to prevent and detect future violations of law; and (8) sub-
mit periodic reports to the court or probation officer regarding the or-
ganization's progress toward the implementation of its prevention and
detection plan and disclosing any criminal, civil, or administrative pro-
ceedings or formal government investigations or inquiries initiated
against the organization.22 4
According to the Guidelines, the term of probation should be at
least one year when the underlying offense is a felony but in no case
more than five years.2"' Should an organization violate a condition of
probation, the court may either extend the organization's term of pro-
bation, impose more restrictive probation conditions, or revoke proba-
tion and resentence the organization.22
IV. ANALYSIS
The procession of drafts leading up to the Guidelines illustrates the
fact that the final product does not adopt completely any of the theo-
ries of organizational sanctions explored in Part II but rather contains
elements of all of them. The Commission essentially began with the two
1988 discussion drafts, one representing the optimal penalty version of
222. Id. § 8D1.3(b) at 380.
223. Id. § 8D1.3(c) at 380.
224. Id. § 8D1.4 at 381-82.
225. Id. § 8D1.2 at 380.
226. Id. § 8D1.5 at 382.
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the economic approach and the other representing the probation ori-
ented organizational theory approach.117 It then adopted elements of
both approaches in devising the Guidelines. This Part of the Recent
Development examines the wisdom of the Commission's choices and
compromises in view of the policy reasons for promulgating sentencing
guidelines, the statutory goals of sentencing, and the economic and or-
ganizational theories of organizational sanctions.
A. Why Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations?
Congress never explicitly instructed the Commission to promulgate
sentencing guidelines for organizations.228 Indeed, the need for organi-
zational guidelines is not readily apparent. Organizations are sentenced
in federal courts so infrequently, only about 350 per year,22 that orga-
nizational guidelines hardly seem worthwhile. Nevertheless, disparate
sentences for defendants convicted of substantially the same conduct, a
principle reason behind the demand for individual sentencing guide-
lines, also is a problem in the area of organizational sentencing.23 0
Several aspects of the Guidelines seriously compromise their ability
to eliminate disparity. First, the fact that the Guidelines' fine provi-
sions apply only to certain types of offenses"' virtually guarantees that,
at least with respect to fines, a disparity will persist for a significant
portion of organizational crimes. Second, the Guidelines' fine and pro-
bation provisions both allow sentencing courts a great deal of discretion
in determining fines within ranges, departing from fine ranges, and as-
signing conditions of probation. 2
A more compelling reason for promulgating organizational guide-
lines, however, is the perception that past sentencing practices have not
achieved the purposes of sentencing. Whether because of a lack of judi-
cial familiarity with the complexities of organizational sentencing or a
lack of judicial resolve to impose meaningful sentences, past organiza-
tional sentencing practices have proven inadequate.233 But do the
Guidelines correct these past failures?
227. See notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
228. See note 122 and accompanying text.
229. 54 Fed. Reg. at 47056.
230. Cohen, et al., 10 Whittier L. Rev. at 111 (cited in note 80).
231. See notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
232. See notes 210, 219, 223-24 and accompanying text.
233. Recidivism is common among organizational defendants. Clinard and Yeager found that
42% of the 477 largest manufacturing corporations had multiple violations during the 1975-76
period. Clinard and Yeager, Corporate Crime at 116-19 (cited in note 3).
1993] 225
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Assessment of Guidelines Pertaining to Monetary Sanctions
The goals of sentencing addressed by the Guidelines are primarily
restitution or remediation, just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion.234 Another goal of sentencing, protection of the public, is really the
same as deterrence and rehabilitation in the organizational context.
The Guidelines' monetary sanctions achieve each of these goals in vary-
ing degrees.
Before examining the implications of the Guidelines' monetary
sanctions for just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, however,
an examination of the levels of monetary sanctions that the Guidelines
will actually produce is necessary. The primary types of monetary sanc-
tions under the Guidelines are restitution, remedial orders 35 and fines.
The Guidelines ensure that in most cases an organization will be sen-
tenced to pay restitution to victims or otherwise remedy the harm
caused by its offense.23 6 Moreover, when an organization's ability to pay
monetary sanctions is in doubt, restitution is the first priority.2 37 Since
restitution and remediation seek to compensate the victims of an of-
fense,38 the Guidelines generally will require that a convicted organiza-
tion pay an amount in restitution and remediation that approximates
the loss from the offense.
The second type of monetary sanction is the fine. Because most
organizational crimes are economic crimes or crimes against property,2 3
9
a sentencing court usually will be able to calculate the gross gain and
loss resulting from an offense. The loss generally will exceed the gain
and therefore will provide the base fine.240 Although knowing how often
the fine table will provide the base fine is difficult, it most likely will do
so only when calculation of gain or loss would unduly complicate or
prolong sentencing.24'1 While the fines in the fine table are not the most
severe ones that the Commission considered, they nonetheless are
significant.2 42
Regardless of how the base fines are determined, the impact of the
aggravating and mitigating culpability factors often will be significant.
Except when high-level management participated in, condoned, or was
234. See notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
235. Remedial orders are essentially monetary sanctions since they merely require that an
organization spend money.
236. See notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
237. See note 216 and accompanying text.
238. See notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
239. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 6 (cited in note 10); Cohen, et al., 10
Whittier L. Rev. at 115 (cited in note 80).
240. United States Sentencing Commission, 10 Whittier L. Rev. at 10 (cited in note 126).
241. See Strasser, 12 Nat'l L. J. at 38 (cited in note 156); note 187 and accompanying text.
242. See notes 126, 141-53, 157, 168, 182-219 and accompanying text.
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willfully ignorant of the offense, or when tolerance of the offense by
substantial authority personnel was pervasive, organizations frequently
will be able to substantially decrease their fines. In such cases, even if
the organization had no program to prevent and detect law violations, it
could reduce its culpability score to zero by disclosing the offense, coop-
erating in the subsequent investigation, and accepting responsibility for
the offense.243 Of course, the probability that an organization will dis-
cover an offense before the authorities begin an investigation is much
lower for organizations without prevention and detection plans. With at
least a minimally sufficient prevention and detection plan, an organiza-
tion can take advantage of both the three point deduction in its culpa-
bility score for having a plan prior to the offense and also can increase
its chances of qualifying for the five point self-disclosure deduction.244
In any event, an organization can qualify for a two point deduction by
cooperating in the investigation and accepting responsibility for the of-
fense.245 Thus, when the offense does not involve management and
when the organization has a minimally sufficient prevention or detec-
tion plan, the organization often will qualify for the lowest fine range.
On the other hand, when the offense does involve management, the
culpability score and resulting fine range likely will be high. In such
cases, the existence of a prevention and detection plan will be irrelevant
because it will be deemed ineffective as a mitigating factor.2 46 Also, it
would not increase the likelihood that management, who already know
they are breaking the law, will turn themselves in. Moreover, manage-
ment involvement is an aggravating factor that will increase the culpa-
bility score.247 In addition, management involvement increases the
likelihood that other aggravating factors such as past similar miscon-
duct and obstruction of justice will be relevant. Thus, in general, when
management is involved in the offense, the Guidelines' fine range will
be relatively high; and when management is not involved, and particu-
larly when the organization has a prevention and detection plan, the
Guidelines' fine range will be relatively low.
Regardless of what fine ranges the Guidelines prescribe, however,
two provisions of the Guidelines may help produce actual fines that are
significantly below these ranges. These provisions concern fine reduc-
tions due to statutory maximums and defendants' inability to pay.
When a Guideline fine exceeds the maximum fine authorized by stat-
ute, the Guideline fine is reduced to the level of the statutory maxi-
243. See note 202 and accompanying text.
244. See notes 118-203 and accompanying text.
245. See note 203 and accompanying text.
246. See note 118 and accompanying text.
247. See notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
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mum.248 Obviously, statutory maximums are a problem beyond the
power of the Sentencing Commission to remedy; nevertheless, they may
significantly affect the operation of the present Guidelines. The statu-
tory maximums for organizational fines are governed by 18 U.S.C. §
3571(c). Pursuant to Section 3571(c), the maximum organizational fine
most likely will be the greater of twice the gross gain or loss from the
offense, or the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense.249
When the maximum fine is set at twice the gross gain or loss from the
offense, the Guideline fine range will partially or completely exceed the
statutory maximum as long as the base fine is the greater of the gross
gain or loss and the minimum and/or maximum multipliers exceed two.
The minimum and/or maximum multipliers will exceed two whenever
the culpability score exceeds the initial score of five.2 50 In such a situa-
tion, therefore, the statutory maximum would diminish the operation of
the aggravating culpability factors.
The second provision that will help produce lower actual fines con-
cerns fine reductions for defendants' inability to pay. The Guidelines
provide that when a fine would threaten the continued viability of an
organization, the court must reduce the fine to the maximum level that
the organization can withstand. 5' In view of this provision, organiza-
tions conceivably could reduce their expected fine from an offense by
reducing their ability to pay a fine. To the extent that such strategic
behavior occurs, the actual fines assessed under the Guidelines could be
significantly lower than what the Guidelines otherwise would prescribe.
Under the Guidelines, amounts paid in restitution and remediation
never are deducted from the fines assessed. 52 Thus, the total monetary
sanction will equal the amount paid in restitution and remediation, an
amount that approximates the loss from the offense, plus the fine. This
amount generally will vary from relatively low levels-depending on
ability to pay, involvement of management in the offense, and the exis-
tence of a prevention or detection plan-to an amount equal to the
greater of twice the gross gain or loss from an offense or an amount
specified in the statute setting forth the offense. Although not actually
paid by the organization, monetary sanctions assessed against an organ-
ization's individual agents and arising out of the same offense also may
be viewed as comprising part of the organization's total monetary sanc-
tion. Monetary sanctions assessed against such individuals will have
some effect on the achievement of the goals of sentencing. Indeed, the
248. See note 215 and accompanying text.
249. See note 32 and accompanying text.
250. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
251. See note 217 and accompanying text.
252. See note 177 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines themselves state that they seek to ensure organizational
sentences that, in combination with individual sentences, will achieve
the goals of sentencing.253
Having gained some insights into what the total monetary sanc-
tions under the Guidelines generally will be, assessing the consequences
of these monetary sanctions for the sentencing goals of restitution, just
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation is possible. In general, the
Guidelines will accomplish the goals of restitution and remediation. 54
Both economists and organizational theorists would agree that restitu-
tion and remediation are appropriate organizational sanctions.2"55 More-
over, restitution and remediation also advance the objectives of just
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
The Guidelines' progress toward the other three goals is less clear.
Just punishment means that punishment should be proportional to the
severity and moral blameworthiness of the crime. 56 In the organiza-
tional context, monetary sanctions that achieve both just punishment
and deterrence are illusive because of the perceived incompatibility of
the two goals. In other words, monetary sanctions that are large enough
to deter often seem disproportional to the severity of the offense and
the culpability of the offender. 57
Ostensibly, the Guidelines achieve just punishment. Sentences of
restitution and remediation are inherently just. 53 The Guidelines' fine
methodology, adjusting a base fine designed to reflect the severity of
the offense according to factors designed to correspond to the culpabil-
ity of the organization, 5' also seems to achieve just punishment. Never-
theless, several aspects of the Guidelines suggest that its total monetary
sanctions will not always constitute just punishment. The first problem
concerns the Guidelines' culpability factors. Management involvement,
past instances of similar misconduct, violations of judicial orders, ob-
struction of justice, the existence of a bona fide plan to prevent and
detect violations of law, self-disclosure of offenses, cooperation with au-
thorities, and acceptance of responsibility are all legitimate indicators
of culpability. 60 The one troubling aspect of these factors is that the
upward adjustment of the culpability score for management involve-
ment varies from one to five points depending on the size of the organi-
253. See note 174 and accompanying text.
254. See notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
255. See notes 46-116 and accompanying text.
256. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 42-45 (cited in note 10).
257. See note 85 and accompanying text.
258. See Parker, Criminal Sentencing, in Discussion at 42-45.
259. See notes 182-212 and accompanying text.
260. See note 190 and accompanying text.
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zation. 6' 1 The Sentencing Commission's justification for the use of size
as a factor is that the breach of trust associated with management in-
volvement is greater in larger organizations.26 ' An organizational theo-
rist most likely would approve of the use of organization size as a factor
since organization theory argues that organization size can contribute to
organizational crimes. 2'3 An economist, on the other hand, likely would
object to the consideration of organizational size.264
The second aspect of the Guidelines that seemingly is contrary to
the idea of just punishment is the general lack of coordination of mone-
tary sanctions. The Guidelines do not allow monies paid in restitution
and remediation to be deducted from fines.26 5 Thus, after assessing a
fine that ostensibly reflects the severity of the offense and the culpabil-
ity of the offender, the Guidelines require additional payments of resti-
tution and remediation. By definition, this lack of coordination of fines
and restitution seems to constitute unjust punishment. The economic
approach would allow amounts paid in restitution and remediation to
be deducted from fines except when the additional monetary sanction
was necessary to compensate for statutory limits on fines.266 An organi-
zational theorist, believing that monetary sanctions tend to spill over
onto innocent groups, also would favor such coordination. 26 1 This rea-
soning also applies to the coordination of criminal monetary sanctions
imposed on organizations with civil and administrative monetary sanc-
tions arising from the same conduct. The Guidelines consider such col-
lateral monetary sanctions only in determining the fine within the
range.268 To better ensure just punishment, such collateral monetary
sanctions should be considered in setting the fine range initially. Fi-
nally, this reasoning suggests that monetary sanctions imposed on orga-
nizations and their individual agents should be coordinated. Although
the Guidelines' introductory commentary expresses the view that orga-
nizational and individual sanctions taken together should achieve the
goals of sentencing,26 9 the Guidelines conspicuously never again men-
tion sanctions imposed on individuals.
The next issue worthy of consideration is whether the total mone-
tary sanctions under the Guidelines will deter organizational crime. In
261. See notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
262. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5 comment. at 367 (backg'd).
263. See Clinard & Yeager, Corporate Crime at 126 (cited in note 3); notes 102-08 and ac-
companying text.
264. See notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
265. See note 177 and accompanying text.
266. See notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
267. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
268. See notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
269. See note 174 and accompanying text.
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the organizational context, deterrence means deterring management
from deliberately violating the law and ensuring that management will
invest in effective internal controls to prevent violations of law. As dis-
cussed in Part II, organizational theorists hold that monetary sanctions
alone can never successfully deter organizational crime.270 An econo-
mist, however, who favors virtually exclusive reliance on monetary sanc-
tions, would likely find that the Guidelines are able to deter in most but
not all cases.
Under the economic approach, the total monetary sanction must
exceed the gain or loss from the offense divided by the probability of
detection.271 If gain is used, the fine must be increased by the cost of
implementing a prevention or detection plan, to achieve optimal deter-
rence.27 2 As discussed above, when management is not involved in an
offense and when the organization had an effective program to prevent
and detect crime, the total monetary sanction under the Guidelines
likely will be relatively small. From a deterrence standpoint, small fines
in these situations are permissible since these crimes are not likely to be
deterred under any circumstances. The only danger is that small fines
in these situations might cause management to enforce its prevention or
detection plan less vigorously than it should. When management is in-
volved, the economic approach identifies two reasons why the Guide-
lines' total monetary sanction will not serve as a perfect deterrent. The
first reason is that when the base fine is based on gain, the Guidelines
fail to increase the fine by the cost of implementing an effective preven-
tion and detection plan. The second reason is that the Guidelines do
not explicitly take into account the probability that an organizational
offender will be detected and convicted in calculating the monetary
penalty. Although the probability of detection and conviction may be
implicit in the Guidelines' culpability factors,273 these rough proxies
sometimes will fail. For example, when the statutory maximum fine is
twice the loss from the offense, the highest possible total monetary
sanction under the Guidelines would be three times the loss (restitution
approximately equal to the loss plus a fine of twice the loss). Under the
optimal penalty version of the economic approach, this monetary sanc-
tion would fail to deter if the probability of detection was less than one-
third. Moreover, the limited applicability of the Guidelines' fine provi-
sions, the availability of fine reductions for inability to pay, and the
operation of the statutory maximums will diminish the deterrent effect
of the Guidelines' monetary sanctions.
270. See notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
271. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
272. See note 60 and accompanying text.
273. See notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Guidelines' monetary sanctions generally will not reha-
bilitate an offending organization. When dealing with purely monetary
sanctions, rehabilitation is essentially the same as future deterrence.
Under either an organizational theory or economic approach, an offense
that was not deterred by a monetary sanction in the past will not be
deterred by that same monetary sanction in the future.
C. Assessment of Guidelines Pertaining to Probation
Probation relates primarily to the sentencing goals of rehabilitation
and just punishment. It relates to restitution or remediation only in the
sense that it provides a mechanism for imposing and enforcing such
sentences. It relates to deterrence only indirectly.
In general, organization theorists will approve of the Guidelines'
probation provisions and will only regret that they are not more far
reaching. Organization theorists believe that probation can effectively
rehabilitate an organizational offender by requiring that the organiza-
tion study the cause of its offense and implement a program to prevent
and detect future violations of law. 4 Moreover, they believe that mon-
etary sanctions alone cannot achieve this result.2 75 In addition, organi-
zation theorists believe that probation achieves just punishment better
than monetary sanctions because it focuses the penalty on the truly cul-
pable, whereas fines can spill over onto innocent groups.
Economists, however, argue that monetary sanctions set at the
right level will cause organizations to implement preventive programs,
thereby eliminating the need for rehabilitation .276 Likewise, since econ-
omists exclusively rely on monetary penalties to achieve just punish-
ment, they would argue that probation is unnecessary to meet this goal.
Except when used to impose or enforce a monetary sanction, econo-
mists hold probation unduly intrusive and inefficient. 7
Two particular aspects of the Guidelines' probation provisions
might concern an economist. First, the ability of a court to enforce its
probation conditions is an inherent limit on the effectiveness of proba-
tion. To the extent that a court enforces its probation condition with
monetary penalties, probation is no more effective than monetary
sanctions.
Assuming that a court will be able to enforce its probation condi-
tions by contempt or some other means, the Guidelines' probation pro-
274. See notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
275. See notes 70-116 and accompanying text.
276. See notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
277. See id.
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visions present a second difficulty. The Guidelines require probation
whenever, at the time of sentencing, an organization having fifty or
more employees does not have an effective program to prevent and de-
tect law violations.2 7 8 Furthermore, the Guidelines' recommended con-
ditions of probation would require organizations to implement
programs to prevent and detect violations of law in general, not just
violations similar to the offense of conviction.2 79 Arguably, the operation
of organizational probation should be more restrained. Indeed, the stat-
utory requirements that conditions of probation (1) be reasonably re-
lated to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant and (2) involve only such depriva-
tions of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary to achieve the
purposes of sentencing may require such restraint.2 80 Because a single
offense does not necessarily indicate that a program to prevent and de-
tect violations of law is really necessary, probation conditions requiring
such programs should be reserved for repeat offenders. Furthermore,
because a single type of offense does not necessarily indicate a need for
a program aimed at preventing and detecting all types of offenses, pro-
bation conditions only should require programs aimed at preventing
and detecting misconduct similar to the offense of conviction. Thus,
whereas an organizational theorist would embrace and seek to expand
the Guidelines' probation provisions, an economist would prefer strictly
to limit their operation.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
In light of the preceding analysis, the, Sentencing Commission
should consider six amendments to the Guidelines. First, the Guide-
lines' fine provisions should be extended to cover all organizational of-
fenses. Second, the Guidelines' provision allowing reduced fines for
inability to pay should be eliminated. Third, the Guidelines should ex-
plicitly coordinate all monetary penalties except when necessary to
compensate for the restrictions of statutory maximums on fines. Fourth,
the aggravating culpability factor relating to management involvement
in an offense should not vary with the size of the organization. Fifth,
the Guidelines should explicitly consider the probability of detection
and conviction in determining the total monetary sanction. Sixth, pro-
bation conditions requiring organizations to implement prevention and
detection programs should be limited to repeat offenders and should
extend only to misconduct similar to the offense of conviction.
278. See note 220 and accompanying text.
279. See notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
280. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1988).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Criminal sanctions are an important means of controlling organiza-
tions. The Guidelines represent a significant step toward the more ef-
fective use of criminal sanctions against organizations. Nevertheless,
organizational behavior and the effect of organizational sanctions are
complex phenomena. While monetary sanctions alone may not be a per-
fect organizational control mechanism, intrusive probation conditions
supervised by overburdened federal judges have significant shortcom-
ings as well. In view of the limits of criminal sanctions, effective control
of organizations may require more direct government regulation or fun-
damental changes in the powers and privileges granted to organizations
by the state. For now, however, the new Sentencing Guidelines for Or-
ganizations are a significant step toward improved societal control of
organizational behavior.
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